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Pain, Perception, and the Sensory Modalities: 
Revisiting the Intensive Theory 
 
(Published in The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 5 (1), pp.87-101 - the 
final publication is available at link.springer.com.)  
 
Abstract. Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a 
distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or 
potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in 
terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that 
pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to 
indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by means of a 
sensory modality exceed a significant level of intensity. Viewing the system 
underlying pain experience as an integral and functionally integrated feature of all 
the senses provides a new perspective on the diverse forms of pain, what it is like to 
experience pain and the contrasting natures of pain and pleasure. 
 
The intensive theory and the sensory theory stood in opposition to one 
another, and they both stood in opposition to the traditional pleasure-pain 
theory which represented pain as an affective quale. In the decade between 
1886-1896, these different opinions clashed and a three-cornered controversy 
ensued, the like of which has never before, nor since, appeared in the 
scientific literature. (Dallenbach 1938, p.337) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, three views of the nature of 
pain vied for general acceptance. Most philosophers and some like-
minded psychologists, citing the affective character of the experience of 
pain, endorsed the traditional view that pain should be understood in 
relation to pleasure. The pleasure-pain theory can be traced back to 
Plato and Aristotle, who held that pleasure and pain are opposing 
passions of the soul. Apart from the presence of opposing affects, the 
theory received support from the apparent contrast between pleasure 
and pain, on the one hand, and perceptual experiences, on the other: 
experiences of pleasure and pain seem distinct from the perceptual 
experiences of the five traditional senses – vision, audition, touch, taste 
and smell – in that they are not associated with any obvious sensory 
organs, nor do they have objects comparable to the familiar sensible 
qualities, nor are they caused by any distinctive physical stimuli. Unlike 
the pleasure-pain theory, the intensive theory of pain acknowledged a 
link between pain and perception, holding that the experience of pain is 
due to the intensity of the stimulation to which the specific nerve fibres 
of the five sensory modalities are at times subjected. The sensory theory, 
by contrast, held that the experience of pain is realized by a system of 
dedicated nerve fibres, which should thus be regarded as constituting a 
distinct sensory modality.  
 It is generally accepted that the sensory theory, rather than the 
intensive theory, had the empirical evidence on its side. Initial support 
for the presence of a system of dedicated nerve fibres underlying pain 
came in a number of forms: the mapping of punctiform areas of the skin, 
each of which is only sensitive to a single sort of stimulation associated 
with warmth, cold, pressure or pain; the independent impairment of the 
systems underlying the detection of those four stimuli; and the different 
action of anaesthetics on those systems. More recent research has 
confirmed that experiences of pain are realized by a variety of receptor 
types, nociceptors, which are distinct from the receptor types underlying 
warmth, cold and pressure, and which have their own pathways to 
dedicated pain centres in the brain. 
While it is plausible that the presence of a separate system 
underlying pain, physiologically comparable to those of the other senses, 
is necessary for the individuation of a sensory modality, it is implausible 
that this is sufficient.1 For it has also to be established that nociception 
compares to the paradigm senses in other relevant respects.2 The recent 
attention of philosophers, many of whom are sympathetic to the sensory 
theory, has tended to focus on the features of pain that would seem to 
set it apart, such as its essential privacy (a pain can only be felt by one 
person), its subject-dependence (the being of a pain depends on its 
being felt), its incorrigibility (one cannot be wrong about the pains that 
are felt) and, of course, its affective nature.3 My focus here will be 
different. 
There are general conditions other than the presence of a distinct 
physiological system that, in the case of the paradigm sensory 
modalities, need to be met for the instantiation of a sensory modality, or 
                                                   
1 In the more recent philosophical literature Pitcher (1970, p.372), Newton (1989, 
p.572), Hall (1989, p.644) and Aydede (2009, p.559) all cite the presence of a dedicated 
neural system as evidence for the presence of a distinct sensory modality. All but 
Aydede also use this as support for the view that nociception is perceptual. 
2 As the editors have pointed out to me, the use of ‘nociception’ in the literature is 
sometimes confusing. Here I am using the term to refer to the physiological system, in 
part composed of nocioceptors, that responds to intense stimulation and typically gives 
rise to the experience of pain. As such, I am in this paper proposing an account of the 
function of nociception, and thereby of the nature of the experience of pain to which it 
gives rise. 
3 Pitcher (1970) and Tye (1995a) provide characteristic responses regarding the first 
three putative differences; see Aydede (2009) for a counter-argument. See section four 
for more on the affective nature of pain. 
so it is generally thought. In §2, I set out some of the challenges faced by 
the sensory theory of pain when individuation conditions for the sensory 
modalities are applied to nociception, and especially when a satisfactory 
account of the distinctive informational content of pain experience is 
sought, given the presence of significantly different types of pain. In §3, I 
motivate an alternative account; this can be thought of as an updated 
version of the intensive theory. According to this account, the primary 
function of pain experience is to indicate when the stimuli that are 
sensed whenever anything is perceived by means of a sensory modality 
exceed a significant level of intensity. In this model, the nociceptive 
system is construed as an integral and functionally integrated feature of 
all the sensory modalities. In viewing pain experience in the way that it 
does, the intensive theory provides a new perspective on the variation in 
types of pain. But the intensive theory does more than this. It also sheds 
light on what it is like to experience pain and the contrasting natures of 
pain and pleasure; the former topic is discussed in §4, the latter in §5. 
 
 
2. Pain and the Individuation of the Senses  
 
It is a truism about perception that it has modes. Almost as 
uncontroversial is that every act of perception is necessarily the act of a 
mode of perception. After all, what could an instance of perception be 
that was not also an instance of a mode of perception? Hence, in order 
for nociception to be perceptual, as the majority of sensory theorists 
claim it to be, it is reasonable to think that it must be a mode of 
perception.4 And, if nociception were a sensory modality, one would 
expect it to satisfy the sort of conditions that serve to individuate the 
senses. 
It is a matter of lively debate at present how exactly we should 
construe the constitution and individuation of the senses.5 But there are 
some candidate conditions that it is generally agreed form a plausible 
starting point. Whether there is a distinct sensory modality depends on 
whether: (1) there are experiences that have a general character and 
content that simultaneously unifies them and distinguishes them from 
other kinds of experiences, (2) the experiences have a separate class of 
physical stimuli as their causes, and (3) the experiences are facilitated by 
a distinctive sensory organ and connected physiological system.6 Vision 
and hearing are paradigmatic senses in so far as they can be 
distinguished by reference to each of these conditions. What it is like to 
experience the colours and shapes of things and to experience the 
sounds things make, and what the respective types of experiences are 
about, give a unity to visual experiences and to auditory experiences, 
and serve to distinguish vision and hearing. The way in which some of 
our experiences are caused by electromagnetic waves of a specific range 
                                                   
4 A minority of sensory theorists deny that nociception is perceptual. They nevertheless 
take it to be sensory, i.e. having sensory content, and mediated by a distinct sensory 
modality. So the objections raised in this section also apply to them. In a recent 
discussion, Corns (forthcoming) notes how, on some views, pain is construed as being 
perceptual but mediated by one of the standard senses, e.g. touch, rather than a 
distinctive sense. In my view, construing pain in this way just makes the task of 
motivating the perceptual approach more difficult for those that seek to do so.   
5 See Macpherson (2011) for a sample of classic and contemporary contributions. 
6 These conditions were first set out by Grice (reprinted in Macpherson (2011)). Of 
central concern for Grice in his paper was whether character and content should count 
as separable conditions. Grice also gives his reasons to think that pain does not involve 
a sense. These are that pain is not greatly variegated except in intensity and location, 
there is no standard procedure for getting a pain, and many types of object can cause 
pain.  
and other experiences are caused by pressure waves of a specific range 
serves equally to distinguish vision and hearing, as does their being 
differentially enabled by eyes and associated visual systems and ears and 
associated auditory systems.7 Matters may be somewhat more complex 
for the other sensory modalities in some respects. It is harder to 
differentiate the senses of smell and taste by reference to some of these 
conditions, and there is disagreement over whether touch should be 
divided into distinct senses on their basis. These issues, however, are 
minor in comparison to the difficulties associated with individuating a 
sense of nociception. For nociception would seem not to satisfy any of 
these conditions. 
Given that different types of receptors and connected neurological 
systems have been associated with nociception, a distinct sensory 
modality can only be individuated by reference to other distinguishing 
yet unifying features. In the case of human vision, for example, where 
there are different kinds of visual receptors (rods and three types of 
cones) and the optical systems connected to them have different 
functional roles (for representing colour, shape, movement, etc.), the 
different receptor types and connected systems can all be identified as 
visual both by reference to an associated common experience type (of 
multicoloured located objects), and by reference to a common stimulus 
type (electromagnetic radiation). However, it is commonly held that 
nociceptive experiences form a heterogeneous group (stabbing, burning, 
throbbing, etc.), the only feature that unites them all being their affective 
                                                   
7 This is not to deny the significant role that is played in perceptual experience by 
cross-modal processes. But these processes presuppose the presence of distinct senses. 
quality. The problem here is that although this may enable the 
differentiation of nociceptive experiences from other perceptual 
experiences, it does not do so in the same way as that by which the non-
affective experience types associated with the paradigm sensory 
modalities are differentiated from each other. Furthermore, one cannot 
fall back on a common stimulus type that is the cause of pain 
experiences to unify them because there is no common stimulus type. 
Indeed, evidence indicates that at least some nociceptors (the so-called 
polymodal nociceptors) are stimulated by a variety of different physical 
stimuli. 
These difficulties could perhaps be addressed if the content of 
nociception – what nociceptive experiences are about – were of a 
unifying nature. But identifying a unifying content for nociception turns 
out to be just as problematic. For the types of pain that occur would 
seem to be different from each other in content in a way that is quite 
unlike any differences in content found in any of the other sensory 
modalities. 
The tendency has been to overlook this problem in the recent 
literature. Consider two statements of the putative content of 
nociceptive experiences that are representative of what sensory theorists 
claim: 
 
[…] to be aware of a pain is to perceive – in particular, to feel, by means of 
the stimulation of one’s pain receptors and nerves – a part of one’s body 
that is in a damaged, bruised, irritated, or pathological state, or that is in 
a state that is dangerously close to being one or more of these kinds of 
states. (Pitcher 1970, p.372) 
 
[N]ociception conveys a rather narrow range of information, since its 
receptors are pretty much limited to the following kinds of things: 
whether the bodily damage is merely imminent, is actually occurring, or 
is left over from past wounds; what its location is; what type of damage it 
is (burn, cut, bruise etc.); and how bad it is. (Hall 1989, p.645) 
 
These descriptions are consistent with the common practice of 
classifying pain as either (i) transient, (ii) acute or (iii) chronic (Loeser & 
Melzack 1999). Transient pain occurs when damage to the body is 
imminent. Damage need not occur. Indeed, transient pain would seem 
to have the function of making us avoid imminent damage. Transient 
pain is associated with noxious stimuli, such as excessive thermal or 
pressure stimuli. When they impinge on a part of the body we typically 
take evasive action before damage occurs. Acute and chronic pains occur 
when the body is actually damaged. Acute pain is typically brought about 
when the pain receptors are activated following injury to body tissue, 
e.g. a cut to the finger. Chronic pain is caused by injury or disease where 
the body’s healing mechanisms cannot return it to the normal state, e.g. 
loss of body part, scarring, or damage to the nervous system. 
The sensory theory, as exemplified by the above quotations, 
glosses over the differences between the forms of pain, and focuses on 
the putatively common content: the states or properties of parts of the 
body that can be characterized in terms of damage. It is by reference to 
damage – a common feature – that the diverse kinds of pain are 
conflated, and the individuation of a distinct sensory modality is 
motivated. However, one difference between the putative contents of the 
diverse types of pain should not be ignored. 
It is generally accepted that the content of the perceptual 
experiences of the various sensory modalities involves features, such as 
colour, sound, texture, odour and taste, that are immediately perceived 
and that are currently instantiated, occurring or present, depending on 
whatever the appropriate category is to which they belong – state, 
property, event or object.8 If other so-called ‘higher-level’ properties 
feature in the content of perceptual experience, then they feature in 
addition to these more basic contents of perceptual experience. 
According to the above quotations, the perceptible feature that should be 
added to this list in the case of nociception is damage. However, while 
damage is a feature that is instantiated, occurring or present in acute 
and chronic pain, and thereby may be immediately perceived, it is 
neither immediately perceived nor instantiated, occurring or present in 
transient pain. Indeed, as already noted, transient pain contributes to 
the prevention of damage to the body. 
The significance of the problem raised by the difference in 
apparent content of these types of pain, when content is construed in 
terms of damage, can be appreciated by considering those sensory 
theories that seek to explain the character of nociceptive experience by 
reference to the content of experience. For given a difference in content 
                                                   
8 For present purposes, I am neutral on the issue of how best to understand content, 
whether perceptual experience relates us to how things are (the relational approach), 
or represents how things are (the representational approach), and the various ways in 
which content may then be understood within these approaches. 
one would expect a difference in character. But there is no obvious 
difference in character that distinguishes the different types of pain 
apart from their duration. Indeed, in the case of transient pain there is 
no damage to be represented. 
Consider one account. Similar considerations will apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to non-representationalist approaches. According to 
reductive representationalism, the best way to explain the character of 
nociceptive experience is by reference to content, which can itself then 
be further explained in terms of natural properties. But if qualitatively 
identical pain experiences could be associated with a disjunction of 
contents, as above, a direct challenge to the general approach would be 
laid down. Michael Tye, who has been one of the foremost proponents of 
the reductive representationalist approach, claims that a type of 
perceptual experience represents what it does in virtue of a relation of 
causal co-variation holding between that type of state and a property. 
Consequently he holds that a type of perceptual experience cannot be 
representationally related to a disjunction of properties; a disjunction of 
properties cannot be the cause of an experience, only either of the 
disjuncts can be its cause (Tye 1995b, p.195). So it is hardly accidental 
that he just cites actual damage to the body in his explanation of the 
content of pain: pains “represent correctly if, and only if, they are caused 
by bodily damage” (Tye 1995a, p.229). But without an explanation for 
why transient pain should not be classed as a type of pain, his proposal 
and those of other sensory theorists leave unexplained a class of 
experiences that are normally classified as pain experiences because they 
share phenomenal character with experiences that are caused by 
damage to the body. 
Sensory theorists might look for a feature that is common to all 
types of pain. The alternative feature that is sometimes mentioned is 
disorder or disturbance: a part of the body is disordered or disturbed 
when damage is imminent, taking place or left over after healing. There 
are, however, problems with expanding the content of nociception in 
this way. Disorder or disturbance is, in this context, such a vague notion 
that adopting it runs the risk of providing, if not an empty explanation, 
at least an appreciably weakened one. More significantly, merely citing 
disorder or disturbance in a part of the body as the content of all these 
nociceptive experiences fails to provide the distinct explanations that the 
presence of these different types of pain seems to require. 
Indeed one of the main tests of any theory of pain is how fully it 
explains the presence of the different types of pain that there are. Given 
that this task remains unresolved when nociceptive experiences are 
construed as arising from the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory 
modality, an alternative approach is called for. Rather than a return to 
the traditional pleasure-pain account, I want to revisit the intensive 
theory of pain, generally considered to have been falsified by the 
empirical evidence, and offer some reasons to think that it has not been 
falsified and, furthermore, that it provides the resources for a more 
viable account of pain in its diverse forms. 
 
 
 
3. The Intensive Theory of Pain  
 
The intensive theory, as originally formulated, claimed that the 
experience of pain is to be explained by the intensity of stimulation to 
which the specific nerve fibres of the various senses are, on occasion, 
subject. Given the correlation between the experience of pain and 
intensity of stimulation, and also between the varieties of pain (stabbing, 
burning, throbbing, etc.) and the experiences characteristic of the 
sensory modalities, there was some basis for the theory. The intensive 
theory seemed to be undermined when it was established that pain 
experiences are realized by a physiologically distinct system. However, 
this finding only falsifies one aspect of the original theory. The theory 
can be restated without it. Just as, in the case of the sensory theory, the 
distinctiveness of a physiological system is insufficient for the 
constitution of a distinct sensory modality, so the susceptibility of the 
specific nerve fibres of the distinct sensory modalities to respond to the 
intensity of stimulation by giving rise to experiences of pain is 
unnecessary for the intensive theory. What is essential to the intensive 
theory, according to the account outlined in this section, is not how pain 
is realized but the role it plays.9 
The function of the paradigm sensory modalities, roughly stated, 
is to process information from the specific stimuli to which they are 
receptive in order to inform us about related properties of other things. 
Vision processes information from electromagnetic waves in order to 
                                                   
9 This is not to deny that there are likely to be good evolutionary reasons for a separate 
physiological system underlying nociception. 
inform us about the colour and brightness of the things we see around 
us. Audition processes information from pressure waves in order to 
inform us about the pitch and loudness of the sounds we hear around us. 
However, as already noted, nociception contrasts with paradigmatic 
sensory modalities in being receptive to several different types of stimuli 
and nociceptive experiences contrast with paradigmatic perceptual 
experiences in having diverse causes. These differences indicate that it is 
not the primary function of nociception to process information from 
physical stimuli in order to inform us about related properties of 
something else, as it is of the paradigmatic senses. The intensive theory 
holds that nociception detects a single aspect of the various types of 
physical stimuli themselves; its main claim is that the role of nociception 
is to inform us when the physical stimuli that are sensed in perceiving 
anything by means of a sensory modality exceed a significant level of 
intensity. The physiological system that realizes experiences of pain, on 
this account, is an integral and functionally integrated feature of the 
various senses. 
Pain experiences are not to be classified as perceptual, according 
to the intensive theory, because such experiences do not have the 
function of facilitating a presentation or representation of the objects, 
events and properties that are the causes of those experiences. This is 
not to say that pain experiences do not carry information or content. For 
they inform us that the sensory stimuli, which, when less intense, are 
used to inform us of the perceptible features of things (and sometimes, 
as in the case of touch, even of the perceptible stimuli themselves), have 
exceeded a threshold of intensity. In short, the intensive theory contrasts 
with the sensory theory in the role that it assigns to the experience of 
pain. To use a term introduced by Kathleen Akins, pain experiences are 
narcissistic, only informing us about the stimuli insofar as they are 
relevant to our well-being.10  
To appreciate the way in which nociception is related to the 
senses, consider a particular case: how nociception is functionally 
integrated with thermoreception (heat perception). Our experience of 
heat and cold is realized by two kinds of thermal receptor: warm 
thermoreceptors and cold thermoreceptors. Warm receptors respond 
with increasing intensity as energy gain causes the temperature of the 
skin to rise above its normal range of 30-36o C; this causes heat 
sensations of a corresponding increase in intensity. Cold receptors 
respond with increasing intensity as energy loss causes the temperature 
of the skin to fall below its normal range; this causes cold sensations of a 
corresponding increase in intensity. For this and other reasons it is 
plausible to think that heat and cold sensations represent the thermal 
energy that is transferred to and from parts of the body, respectively.11 
At about 44o C and about 18o C the responses of the thermal receptors 
sharply decrease, and we no longer feel heat and cold sensations; at 
these temperatures, the intensity of thermal stimulation causes two 
different types of nociceptors to respond, and as a consequence our 
experience of heat pain and cold pain. This degree of coordination 
                                                   
10 Akins (1996). Akins introduces the term to describe thermal sensations. I disagree 
with her account of thermal sensations (see next paragraph); a thermal sensation does 
tell us something about the thermal stimulus itself. I think the term much more 
appropriate for pain sensations, the function of which is to tell us about the relevance 
stimuli have for us. 
11 For a fuller defence of the claim that heat perception involves the representation of 
energy exchanged as opposed to other candidate contents, such as skin temperature, 
see Gray (2013). 
indicates that these types of nociceptive experiences have the role of 
warning us when excessive amounts of thermal energy are exchanged, 
and thereby that they are integral to and integrated within the function 
of the sense (or senses) that we use to perceive heat and cold. 
It is understandable why these sorts of transient nociceptive 
experiences have been construed as informing us of imminent damage 
to a part of the body. For, if we allow the physical stimuli to continue to 
impinge on the body, they will damage it. And it may be natural to form 
the belief that a part of the body is in danger of being damaged from the 
presence of transient pain. But a distinction should be drawn between 
the role of such nociceptive experiences and the content of any beliefs 
we may form on their basis. The role of these nociceptive experiences is 
to signal when the intensity of a stimulus has become too great. 
If the functional integration of nociception with the sensory 
modalities is most obvious in the case of thermoreception, the primary 
function of which is to monitor the amount of energy exchanged 
between subjects and their environments, similar patterns can, 
nevertheless, be found in other sensory modalities by focusing attention 
on the detection of stimulus intensity. The pressure receptors underlying 
touch and audition are able to discriminate the intensities of physical 
stimuli within a limited range of stimulus intensities. When the upper 
limit is reached, the same types of physical stimuli as cause tactile and 
auditory experiences cause nociceptors to respond. Again, given that 
part of the function of touch and hearing is to detect the amount of 
pressure energy impinging on the body, it is natural to construe the role 
of indicating when the amounts of pressure energy become excessive as 
a feature incorporated into the function of the respective sensory 
modalities.12 
Given that the intensive theory is based on an account of transient 
pain, the main challenge to the model is whether it can explain acute 
and chronic pain, where pain is caused by damage and not by the 
intensity of physical stimuli. This challenge should, however, be no more 
difficult to meet than the challenge of explaining the experiences that 
may arise when other component features of the sensory systems are 
damaged. When other kinds of experiences are caused by impairment to 
visual or auditory receptors, such as photisms or tinnitus, it is usual to 
think of those sensory receptors as malfunctioning, and the experiences 
they give rise to as misperceivings of some sort. In that the damage 
caused to the body that gives rise to nociceptive experiences invariably 
involves damage to the nociceptors themselves, it would follow that they 
are not functioning as they have originally been designed to function. 
According to the intensive theory, the primary purpose of nociception is 
to detect physical stimuli that are excessively intense; it follows that 
when the nociceptors are actually damaged by excessively intense 
physical stimuli, and there are no longer any intense stimuli present, the 
resulting experience of pain is akin to a misperceiving elsewhere in the 
sensory modalities. Strange as it may sound, on the present proposal, 
many experiences of pain are comparable to photisms and tinnitus.  
Sensory theorists cannot respond by claiming that nociception is 
unusual among the senses in requiring its receptors to be damaged for 
                                                   
12 Evidence also indicates that bright light causes pain responses. Moreover, since 
nociceptors are also receptive to chemical stimuli, there is reason to think that the 
intensive theory can be extended to smell and taste. 
its proper function.13 For this would be at odds with the function of 
undamaged nociceptors. Indeed, only the intensive theory is able to 
provide a comprehensive explanation for the variety of pain types. 
Whereas it is it clear how a selective advantage would be conferred by 
being aware of when physical stimulation passes a certain threshold of 
intensity, it is often unclear why being aware of damage should confer a 
selective advantage, such as the occurrence of chronic pain that is 
caused by irreparable damage. But it is easy to see why chronic pain 
should occur if it is the upshot of damage to the nociceptive system the 
primary function of which is to signal the occurrence of intense stimuli. 
Moreover, an evolutionary explanation for the selection of a system 
having the function of preventing damage to the body can be extended to 
include secondary benefits that arise when the acute pain caused by 
damage to a part of the body draws attention to the damage and thereby 
enables the protection of that part of the body from further damage. 
However the reverse is harder to motivate; it is difficult to see how an 
explanation for the selection of a system that has the function of 
indicating damage can be extended to include secondary benefits that 
arise from the indication of excessively intense stimulation.  
It would be remiss not to mention another class of nociceptors the 
function of which it appears hard for the intensive theory to explain. The 
so-called silent nociceptors have received little attention in 
philosophical accounts of pain. As the name suggests, under normal 
circumstances silent nociceptors do not respond to stimuli of any sort. 
                                                   
13 In this context one might speculate whether damage to the nociceptors, rather than 
causing them to respond, could have prevented them from responding. 
They are activated by chemical signals that are generated by bodily 
inflammation. Since it is damage to the body that causes silent 
nociceptors to respond, their role might seem to be best explained by the 
sensory theory. Silent nociceptors, so the sensory theory might claim, 
detect damage, thereby allowing us to protect the damaged part of the 
body. Yet even in this case the intensive theory has a competing 
explanation. It can accept that silent nociceptors only function when a 
part of the body is damaged. But it can also maintain that silent 
nociceptors are those receptors for which the threshold at which stimuli 
are detected as being of a significant level of intensity is only activated 
following damage, and then set at a level at which stimuli of otherwise 
normal intensity trigger a nociceptive response. That is to say, when a 
part of the body is inflamed, nociception indicates that even normal 
stimuli have an intensity that is significant. 
In sum, given that the intensive theory provides an apt 
explanation of the several different types of pain that there are, it 
deserves more attention than it has received. But the intensive theory 
offers more than this. For it not only serves to explain the function of 
pain, it provides an opportunity to think about the phenomenal 
character of pain in a different way. 
 
  
4. Why Feeling Pain Does Not Feel Like Perceiving  
 
According to the sensory theory, pain is experienced when we perceive 
damage to the body by means of nociception just as we have 
characteristic perceptual experiences when we perceive things by means 
of the systems underlying the other sensory modalities. But if 
nociception represents in the same way as other sensory modalities, one 
would expect the qualitative character of nociceptive experiences to be 
explicable in the same way as the character of visual, auditory, tactile, 
thermal, olfactory and gustatory experiences. There is, however, an 
obvious difficulty: experiencing pain does not feel like perceiving in 
these ways. The experience of pain has a distinctive affective nature; to 
experience pain feels bad in a way that the visual or tactile experience of 
the damaged or disturbed part of the body that causes pain does not. As 
a consequence, experiencing pain is often sufficient to motivate 
behaviour, whereas the visual or tactile experience of the damaged part 
of the body requires the additional presence of background beliefs, 
desires and perhaps other mental states to motivate behaviour. 
Sensory theorists have adopted a variety of responses to account 
for nociception’s affective nature. Common to them is that the 
experience of pain is constituted by two components: (a) a sensory 
component (about a feature of the body) and (b) some other component 
that explains pain’s affective nature.  According to the desire view, 
“when [animals] engage in that form of sense perception, they want to 
stop doing so, they wish they were not doing so” and “[t]o have some 
spontaneous inclination of this general “anti”-kind is to experience the 
perceptual act (or state) as unpleasant or worse” (Pitcher 1970, p.380). 
The imperative view claims that a pain in a part of your body “should be 
viewed as also telling you not to use that bodily part, in which case all 
pains would contain an imperative component along with the descriptive 
in their intentional content” (Hall 2008, p.354); it is the presence of the 
imperative content that, so it is claimed, explains the motivational force 
of pain and its negative feel.14 For the dislike view the affective features 
of pain are constituted by “an immediate reaction of dislike” to the 
representation of bodily damage (Tye 1995a, p.229). And the evaluative 
view holds that the affective features of pain can be explained by the 
experience not only representing to the subject the disturbance of a part 
of the body but also “representing the disturbance as bad for him in the 
bodily sense” (Bain 2013). 
Despite each of these contrasting accounts of the second 
component of pain explaining certain aspects of pain, there is also much 
to contest in their details, as the proponents of the different views have 
themselves already made clear. However, the intensive theory offers a 
different and more general challenge. For, in providing an alternative 
account of the role of pain and its relationship with perception, 
according to which the experience of pain is not constituted, even 
partially, by the perceptual representation of features of the body, it 
questions the main reason for pursuing a dual-component strategy, 
which was to account for how nociceptive experiences could be 
perceptual experiences yet also be unlike other perceptual experiences in 
important respects. If nociceptive experiences are not perceptual 
experiences of features of the body, there is no longer the original 
motivation for a dual-component strategy. 
Indeed the intensive theory gives rise to a natural explanation of 
the affective nature of pain. In order for nociception to be able to make 
                                                   
14 Klein (2007) defends the imperative view but not a dual-component approach. 
us aware of when and where the physical stimuli that impinge on the 
body are too intense, it must enable experiences that are distinct from 
the normal perceptual experiences of the sensory modalities in a way 
that is dissimilar from the way each mode of perceptual experience is 
different from each other. The distinctive way in which such experiences 
must be different can be narrowed down further. They have to be unlike 
in such a way that they motivate us to remove the stimuli that are too 
intense. That way is for the experience of pain caused by excessively 
intense stimulation to feel bad.15 Hence the distinctive way in which the 
experience of pain feels bad, and the way in which it motivates 
behaviour, are just what are to be expected from an experience that has 
the role of warning us of excessively intense physical stimuli. 
What is more, this explanation does not require two components. 
In holding that the role of pain is to indicate when and where the stimuli 
that are sensed in perceiving anything exceed a significant level of 
intensity, or are too intense, the intensive theory holds that the 
representation of the excessive intensity of physical stimuli can simply 
be the representation of their negative significance. That is to say, 
excessively intense physical stimuli need not themselves constitute the 
content of experience; only the significance that they have for us needs 
to be represented.16 
                                                   
15 Hence we can go further to explaining why function gives rise to experiences with a 
specific qualitative character, pace Levine (1993), in the case of pain. Indeed, it would 
seem that the intensive theory has implications for understanding the metaphysics of 
experience more generally. 
16 Such a view runs counter to the perceptual and representational approaches that 
seek to explain character of experience in terms of content represented. The present 
model acknowledges an irreducible qualitative aspect to nociceptive experiences but 
nevertheless situates this within a functional explanation.   
The present explanation of what it is like to feel pain and why it 
motivates behaviour is an explanation of the affective character of 
transient pain. Since the intensive theory explains acute and chronic 
pain by reference to transient pain, what it is like to feel acute and 
chronic pain can also be explained by reference to what it is like to feel 
transient pain. However, since the explanation of acute and chronic pain 
derives from the dysfunction of the nociceptors, one might not expect 
the same correlation between the negative feel of pain and its 
motivational nature as is found in transient pain. And this is indeed 
what one finds. When nociception is fulfilling its proper function, e.g. 
when an intense stimulus causes pain, the negative feel of transient pain 
correlates with its motivational powers, causing one to remove the part 
of the body from the stimulus. When nociception is not functioning in 
this way the correlation begins to fail. Acute pain, which is experienced 
when one’s body is temporarily damaged, e.g. when one’s finger is cut, 
often fails to motivate any particular response on its own; the response 
that transpires typically presupposes additional background beliefs 
about what has happened and desires about what should happen. At 
least in this respect, an experience of acute pain is more like a typical 
perceptual experience, such as the visual or tactile perception of the 
damage, than transient pain. It may be this that has encouraged the view 
that pain is perceptual and the subsequent need to provide some further 
explanation for its affective and motivational features. But, if the present 
approach is correct, this is misguided. Chronic pain, which is 
experienced when the body is permanently damaged, often does not 
motivate behaviour at all; one just has to live with it. So it is that 
although pain may always feel bad, only sometimes is it bad to have. 
There are a couple of loose ends to tie up. In support of the claim 
that nociception is a functional system that is integrated into the overall 
function of the different sensory modalities, it was noted how pain 
experiences seem to belong to different varieties – burning pain (of the 
hot and cold variety), stabbing pain, throbbing pain, etc. – that related 
to the different sensory modalities. But, if there are such distinct 
varieties of pain, these might seem only to be explained by the presence 
of distinct sensory contents in addition to affective components. There 
is, however, an alternative explanation. We draw the distinctions 
between varieties of pain by reference to our perceptual experience of 
the intense but not yet excessively intense stimuli to which a perceptual 
modality is sensitive. For example, we construe one kind of pain as 
burning pain because of the perceptual experience of intense heat that 
precedes the experience of pain. More generally, we distinguish varieties 
of pain because of the prior perceptual experiences of intense 
stimulation that typically precede them, and therefore provide their 
background. In short, we tend to draw distinctions between varieties of 
pain not because pains have distinct sensory components but because 
pain is an integrated feature of the different sensory modalities. 
 The other loose end relates to whether the intensive theory has 
the resources to explain a pair of well-documented dissociation cases 
that seem to provide evidence for the dual-component approach. 
Chronic pain can be relieved by morphine, or at least, some sufferers of 
chronic pain report that they no longer mind it. It has been argued that 
this shows how the affective component of pain has become dissociated 
from the sensory component through the action of the morphine 
(Aydede 2000). It is hard to deny that morphine modifies the overall 
experience of pain. But patients also maintain that the pain itself feels 
just as bad as before. So a competing explanation, consistent with the 
intensive theory, is available: the dissociation is not between affective 
and sensory components of pain itself but between the affective nature 
of pain and the affective response we have to it. When pain is more than 
merely transient, when it is bad to have, it is something that displeases 
us and, as the action of morphine makes manifest, often intensely so. 
There is, however, another dissociation case involving transient 
pain for which this response seems inadequate: pain asymbolia (Grahek 
2007). Pain asymbolics report that they can feel excessively intense 
stimulation, such as when they are burnt or pricked. So, according to 
how pain is characterized by the intensive theory, it can be inferred that 
they are experiencing pain. Yet, in contrast to morphine cases, 
asymbolics deny that their experiences have any negative feel. Here, 
therefore, the dissociation cannot be between the affective nature of pain 
and our affective response to it; it would seem to be between the 
affective and sensory components of pain. But even here there is an 
alternative explanation. It is that the threshold at which stimuli cause 
pain is raised in asymbolics such that stimuli that previously exceeded 
the threshold and triggered the experience of pain no longer do so. 
Asymbolics still think of their experiences in terms of pain because they 
remain very intense. As is the case with comparable anomalies where the 
use of a concept is extended beyond what is normal, opinions are likely 
to be divided on whether asymbolics are right to continue to describe 
their intense experiences, which are caused by what used to cause pain, 
as instances of pain. 
 
 
5. Why Pain and Pleasure are not Opposites 
 
In advocating the view that the primary function of the experience of 
pain is to indicate when the physical stimuli sensed in perceiving things 
are too intense, the intensive theory also challenges the pleasure-pain 
theory of pain which views pain as the opposite of pleasure. For, if the 
intensive theory provides the correct picture of pain, pain and pleasure 
are unlike in ways that go beyond merely being opposites. However, as 
one might now expect, they are not unlike in quite the way claimed by 
the sensory theory. 
Pain is typically regarded as the opposite of pleasure in the minds 
of ordinary folk because pain’s negative affective character opposes 
pleasure’s positive affective character. This perceived opposition may be 
reinforced by the way that pain is typically disliked and avoided whereas 
pleasure is typically liked and sought. Such a characterization is 
endorsed in the more theoretical context of the pleasure-pain theory, as 
one of its chief advocates at the end of nineteenth century put it: “the 
bond between the two is never questioned. The ground for this lies in the 
fact that the two appear to arise in consciousness as disparate parts of a 
continuum. One fades away into the other.” (Marshall 1889).17 However, 
for pleasure and pain to be properly regarded as opposites, they would 
have to be opposites not merely in a continuum of affective character but 
also in functional role. Yet the intensive theory suggests they are not. 
Whatever the function of the experience of pleasure, it is not the 
opposite of indicating the excessive intensity of physical stimuli.  
To get a better grasp of the contrasting roles of pleasure and pain, 
consider what the sensory theory has to say about them. Murat Aydede, 
in responding to an earlier debate premised on the assumption that only 
sense-data or behavioural dispositions are candidate explanations for 
pleasure and pain, argues that these choices preclude an apt explanation 
for the contrasting natures of pleasure and pain. He argues that, 
although pleasure and pain have opposing affective aspects, pleasure is 
properly construed as having only a non-sensory affective character, 
whereas pain is properly construed as a sensation, having both a non-
sensory affective character and a proprietary sensory content, at least in 
the case of physical pleasure and pain. According to Aydede, when we 
eat chocolate ice cream or smell our favourite perfume (both examples 
of physical pleasures), the experience of pleasure we have is a non-
sensory affective response to sensations derived from the gustatory and 
olfactory sensory modalities. But when we burn or cut a part of the body 
(both examples of physical pain), the experience of pain we have is 
                                                   
17 However, as the early proponents of the pleasure-pain theory found, agreement on a 
more fine-grained characterization of the pleasure-pain continuum was harder to come 
by. Some claimed that pleasure and pain are the fundamental modes of mental life 
from which all forms of mentality derive. Others held that pleasure and pain are sui 
generis modes of mental life brought into consciousness indirectly via sensation, 
emotion and intellection. While others argued that pleasure and pain are quale that 
may arise with all mental phenomena. 
produced by a distinct sensory modality and involves a non-sensory 
affective response to the sensory contents partially constitutive of pain 
itself. He summarizes his position thus: 
 
My claim is that the primitive affective reaction involved in an 
overall experience in which we receive pleasure from certain 
sensations proper is as much a feeling episode as the hurting, awful 
qualitative component of a total pain experience which is itself the 
reactive dimension of pain in the same primitive sense. A total 
experience of pain has its own specialized underlying sensory 
mechanisms, pleasure doesn’t: rather it seems to be a general 
purpose mechanism reacting (certainly in subtly different ways) to 
relevant sensations proper in different (sub)modalities, apparently, 
without discriminating among them. (Aydede 2000, p. 558)  
 
In both pleasure and pain Aydede understands the non-sensory affective 
responses in terms of psychofunctional properties that set parameters 
for behavioural responses. 
The three views with which we started can now be compared and 
contrasted in the following way. First, the sensory theory and the 
pleasure-pain theory agree that the affective aspects of pleasure and 
pain can each be explained as the opposite of the other. The principle 
disagreement between the two theories concerns the contents to which 
these affective components are directed; the sensory theory, but not the 
pleasure-pain theory, claims that pain experiences have proprietary 
contents, typically damage to a part of the body. Second, the intensive 
theory concurs with the sensory theory regarding the presence and 
significance of the specialized receptors underlying the experience of 
pain; the intensive theory diverges from the sensory theory in the 
account it gives of their functional role. Whereas the sensory theory 
holds that the specialized receptors have the function of determining 
proprietary perceptual or sensory contents, the intensive theory assigns 
the specialized receptors the role of detecting when and where the 
stimuli detected by the sensory modalities become excessively intense. 
Finally then, the intensive theory concurs with the pleasure-pain theory 
in holding that neither pleasure nor pain has proprietary sensory 
contents as their constituents. However, this is as far as the agreement 
extends. For, in explaining the functional role of the nociceptive system 
as it does, the intensive theory does not think of it as one might think of 
the system underlying pleasure, as a general purpose mechanism 
reacting to the sensations of other sensory modalities; it thinks of the 
nociceptive system as a mechanism the specific function of which is to 
react to the intensity of stimuli detected by the sensory modalities. 
In addition to the support set out in the previous sections, the 
intensive theory has the advantage over the other theories in being able 
to explain a further striking difference between the experience of 
pleasure and pain. When the intensity of a physical stimulus causes the 
threshold of pain to be crossed, the experience of pain indicative of the 
excessive intensity of the physical stimulation typically becomes the 
centre of attention. For instance, the pain caused by something 
excessively hot tends to eclipse the sensation of heat, and the pain 
caused by a sharp object tends to eclipse the tactile sensation. By 
contrast, in the case of pleasure, it is perceptual experiences and their 
contents that we typically take pleasure in. When we taste a favourite 
food or smell a favourite scent, we take pleasure in the taste and the 
scent. There would be no pleasure without the experience of what we 
take pleasure in. According to the intensive theory, this contrast is easily 
explained: the nociceptive system has a specific function related to the 
intensity of physical stimuli; the pleasure system has a more general 
function related to features other than the intensity of what we perceive. 
The difference in the way in which the experience of pain and 
pleasure relate to the perceptual experiences of the various sensory 
modalities suggest that pleasure should not be opposed to pain; it 
should be opposed to displeasure. For just as we take pleasure in certain 
things that we experience, so we find displeasure in other things that we 
experience. It is displeasure that, like pleasure, seems to be “a general 
purpose mechanism reacting (certainly in subtly different ways) to 
relevant sensations proper in different (sub)modalities”. Opposing 
pleasure and displeasure, rather than pleasure and pain, would also 
explain how it possible for pain, which is typically experienced as 
unpleasant, to cause a positive affective response. Pleasure and 
displeasure involve opposing affective responses to the experiences we 
have. By contrast, pain is an integral and integrated feature of the 
sensory modalities that we use to perceive the world, which is required 
because the world, in making the diversity of forms of perception 
possible, also harbours the possibility of causing harm by similarly 
varied means.18 
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